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SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA EXAMINED

Paris PROJET in French No 165, May 82 pp 559-570

[Article by agronomist Francois de Ravignan: "Contradictions in Africa: Is Farm Development Working for the Peasants?"]

[Text] Everyone is aware of the chronic food supply difficulties experienced by the black African countries of the Sahel. The increasing food deficits are not, however, exclusively reserved for them. They are also found in the countries in the equatorial zone, not only in the overpopulated cities, with increasing unemployment, but also in the countryside, although the climate may be favorable to highly productive agriculture. For example, in the South Cameroon, infant malnutrition exists, and it is widespread in Burundi. Moreover, the majority of the black African countries are, apart from their geographic situation, increasingly dependent on imports of foodstuffs, grains in particular, which are constantly increasing in volume. According to FAO statistics, although it is not in Africa that the worst examples of want occur, it is on this continent that the food situation is deteriorating the fastest today. To stop at making this statement would be dooming the steps taken to treating the symptoms of the evil, as has so often been done. Thus it is necessary to take the trouble to establish where the true causes of the evil lie.

Hunger--A Continuous Development

Drought followed by famine has long been experienced in the Sahel, as Diulde Laya revealed in his interviews with livestock breeders in Niger.¹ But these calamities seem to have come closer together and become more acute in the course of recent years. "The famines which occurred after the 'Evasion' (so called because some ate while their relatives were unable to watch them) have not even been counted, because they are too numerous, so much so that they have not even left us the time to find a name for them," one of the farmers questioned answered. Is the weather becoming dryer? Is the land deteriorating as a result of unprecedented demographic growth? These causes exist. If they were totally at fault, it would only have been necessary to urge an accelerated exodus of the peoples of the Sahel toward regions with less arid climates. But history teaches us that famines have occurred in zones with climates ordinarily favorable to agriculture. Apart from those which have marked the history of Europe, we identify such cases in Africa itself. In

his thesis on Gabon,² Gilles Sautter showed how a famine developed in a country with ample water and rich soil, leading mainly to the deaths of women and children, following the requisition of the manpower for the building of the famous Congo-Ocean railroad. There was indeed no population or weather factor here, but with the men absent, preparation of the fields was impossible. A number of reflections born of observation of the events in the African Sahel suggest that the climatic and demographic causes of food shortage be regarded as less important than has been readily asserted.³

Nor can the present food situation in black Africa be blamed on the too frequently suggested "traditional thinking" of its peasants. They have proven themselves capable of taking up a number of new crops (peanuts, cassava, sweet potatoes, beans) and perfecting adapted cultivation techniques. Today they are entirely ready to improve their work methods, as many of those who have lived in close conjunction with them in the villages can testify. Without a doubt the peasants would, under other conditions, have been able to develop the traditional cultivation systems, using their own resources, in order to adapt them to a growing population volume and to diversified needs. This has been seen in other regions of the world and in other historical epochs (in Europe, in particular, during the "agricultural revolutions" of the 18th and 19th centuries). But today, the traditional African cultivation systems are no longer developing of their own accord: blocked by a century under a colonial economy, they more nearly reveal a regressive development.

The nature of colonization was to destroy the peoples' autonomy, that is to say their capacity to resolve their own problems by themselves. In some cases these people, always kept under subjection, were aided. But the most forceful impact of the colonial period was cultural. The Africans were persuaded that there was only one model of development--that of the peoples of Europe, and that they themselves were basically incapable of imitating this model without the assistance of the mother countries or the former colonizers. Independence did nothing but stress this cultural dependence, taken up in turn by the new nations. On the economic level, this was reflected in the desire to acquire an industry as quickly as possible as a sign of wealth and power: a "developed" country is an industrialized country. But industry is costly and is purchased from the white man, and he must be paid. To do this, it is necessary to step up the export of mineral raw materials when there any, or in any case, farm products. Thus the peasants are urged to expand the area planted to peanuts, cotton or coffee, which in some cases in fact compete, in the realm of labor time and available area, with basic food crops. Moreover, this industry purchased at such a cost from the white man creates few jobs (it even happens that it eliminates them, when it replaces a craft industry with which it competes and which it destroys). Such industry is located in the few large cities, which are growing at a much faster rate than the number of new jobs. In Cameroon, for example, for 1.2 million young people expected to join the urban workforce between 1976 and 1980, the national plan provided for only 81,000 jobs in modern industry.

An activity which is so marginal in relation to the weight of the population as a whole is hardly of a sort to fill a demand for local food crop agriculture. Moreover, the food demands of large cities swing, to some extent, but increasingly, toward export goods, thanks to the desire to imitate and the

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urgings of advertising. The increase in the consumption of bread, for example, in the black African cities, is impressive. Under such conditions, the growing of export crops becomes a necessary evil so that the peasant can obtain the little bit which he absolutely cannot do without. Indeed, from a technical point of view, one could in a certain number of cases contemplate entirely or almost entirely replacing an export crop cultivated with a food crop useful to the country.⁴ But this cannot be developed without a broad enough market to give the price stability. And on this point, the choice of the method of industrialization is basic. The foreign market responds to industries concentrated in large cities, providing few jobs and this limited food demand, with a concentrated supply at stable and relatively moderate prices. Domestic supply, on the other hand, scattered and involving small quantities, is subject to sharp fluctuations which are reflected in the prices. It seems that little thought has been given in Africa to this effect of the method of industrialization on the development of food crop agriculture. In any case, no country has made any original choices here in the realm of industrialization. Imitation of the Western model is the rule, and the Europeans, moreover, have contributed greatly by their advice, their education, their "aid" and their bribes to the adoption of this model.

Industry which does not provide jobs and agriculture which does not provide food...Under such conditions, the population growth which modern Africa is experiencing develops like a cancer on a continent which, however, despite some zones of heavy density, is very far from being among the most heavily populated regions on the planet.

Programs and Plans

Rural development programs and plans were exclusively oriented, as national independence dawned, toward export crops which were to bring in the famous foreign exchange needed for industrial development: there were oil palm plans in various equatorial countries, a 100,000-ton (cacao) project in Cameroon, a peanut project in Senegal, and plans for cotton development in the countries of the Sahel (Upper Volta, Chad, Niger, Mali). The African governments easily found companies and experts in Europe to direct these projects. Intensive technical aid made it possible to obtain often spectacular results, for example the quadrupled cotton production in West Africa during the decade between 1963 and 1973.

Elsewhere, however, the coffee plantations abandoned in Togo and the cacao plantations in Cameroon have experienced low price periods which serve to discourage the peasants. In Senegal, the drop in peanut prices up to 1968 and their failure to rise subsequently finally led in that period to a reduction in plantings by the peasants. Generally speaking, the producer countries have not obtained the income they expected from export crops, since they have had constantly to pay ever increasing prices for their imports. They were forced thereby into forward flight, seeking to augment the production of these crops further by increasing the areas and yields in order to maintain their income.

But the increasing food difficulties have sometimes worked against these intentions, in particular in the countries of the Sahel. In Niger, the production

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of marketable peanuts increased from 150,000 tons prior to the 1973 drought to 18,000 tons afterwards. The lessons to be learned from this drought were, however, ill understood. It was as if the recovery in 1974-1975 suggested to the governments that the weather hazard had been dispelled forever. In the Hausa territory in Niger, an integrated project called 3M (Matameye, Myrria, Magaria) was drafted in a region in which the peasants said "the land is dead." Despite positive aspects, this projects remains, however, heavily based on peanut production, and the cadres are very often mobilized to deal with operations pertaining to this crop. The French Company for the Development of Textile Fibers (CFDT), the leading manager of cotton operations in French-speaking West Africa, deemed it necessary at that time to justify cotton cultivation as posing no threat to the development of agriculture in general. "The cotton crop has become the technical and economic bulwark of a number of regional farm development operations."⁵ This argument must have had weight, since far from halting the "white tide," the government of Upper Volta, for example, continued to encourage it. Today 57,000 tons of cotton are produced annually as compared to 30,000 in 1969 and 6,000 in 1962, while famines have recurred on a number of occasions since 1974, giving the lie to the optimistic predictions of the cotton experts.

In this same country, food shortages have never raised the issue of the volume of dry season garden crops, green beans and peppers, which, produced between December and May, find takers at high prices on the European market. It would, however, be possible to irrigate to produce vegetables wanted on the local market, rice, wheat and tubers. The French companies which serve as middlemen in shipping to Europe profit heavily from the disparity between the prices on the production and consumption levels, from which the producers themselves hardly benefit. A national company in Niamey, Niger, organized domestic truck garden production, of green beans in the main, for Europe. Badly managed, this company has a serious deficit, and as a result Niger is subsidizing the winter consumption of green beans by the people in France!

Generally speaking, the major projects based on export crops are thus still functioning. The competitive nature of income crops and food crops so often denounced has hardly been contemplated at all, it appears, by the national planners. However, the increase in imports of food, grains in particular, which has been necessary for urban consumption has since 1975 been a source of concern to the governments. They have tried to set up specific, and often quite inefficient, projects: a wheat cultivation project on the Adamaoua Plateau in Cameroon, of which the only economic result has been a substantial increase in the country's indebtedness;⁶ rice growing projects in the river valley in Niger, which have led to warnings about the dangers on the level of preservation of the ecosystem and the food supply of the peasant producers;⁷ sugar production projects based on large national plantations with an ultra-modern plant adjacent, on land taken from the peasants, in Niger, Upper Volta and Senegal.

Noting the increasing difficulties in supplying the cities, the government of Cameroon launched the "green revolution" just prior to the party congress in 1975, which was to make possible a consistent increase in marketable food production. The National Rural Development Fund (FONADER), established to finance this "revolution," allocated its credit in fact above all to government

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employees who profited therefrom to establish capitalist farming enclaves, large coffee or cacao plantations in particular.

The livestock breeding projects, newcomers on the scene, have been established in the countries of the Sahel to turn the disorganization of traditional livestock breeding which followed the 1973 drought to advantage. Ranches were organized to take over a part of the herds of the livestock breeders forced to sell, with integrated pasture fattening for the peasants, with a view mainly to supplying the more prosperous classes with meat, and in fact exporting it to Europe. Thus, even when it is a question of producing food products usable in the producer countries, there is strictly no difference in concept between these programs and those which are based on export crops. It is not a question of feeding the peasant and his family, of helping him develop a reproducible tool for work, first of all, but of getting him to produce products which will save money or bring in foreign exchange for the state. Under these conditions, rice can be "famine producing" in the same way as Rene Dumont said coffee was in Togo.

No Peasant Participation

A scattering of varied and ill-coordinated projects do coexist, nonetheless, with these major programs. The FAO fertilizer program implemented in a number of African countries in the years between 1970 and 1980 provides a good illustration. The "experts" for these programs selected a certain number of peasants and helped them cultivate a crop plot with a ready-made fertilizer formula, alongside a control plot without fertilizer. In the majority of cases, the other farming techniques were not altered. One wonders about the efficiency of fertilizer under such conditions! In Niger, the "modernization" of millet cultivation is limited to a few technical aspects which those who staff the base levels never cease to reiterate, without taking variations in local conditions into account--the use of improved seed, fungicide treatment of the seed, fertilizer, proper density in planting, and thinning to every third plant. None of these prescriptions is good or bad in itself, but it would be better to look first at what the peasants do and what results they achieve rather than merely reciting this catechism.

One frequent weakness of the programs is their sectorial distribution under the responsibility of various departments which most often do not work together. For example, the forestry programs most often come under the water and forest departments, which, since they regard the peasant as the main enemy of the tree (or perhaps surpassed by the goat!), take great care to avoid peasant participation in any of the programs at all, regarding any relationship with the peasant solely in terms of penalizing him. Now, the reforestation needs of such regions of the Sahel are such that no administrative department can do anything substantial at all with its own personnel alone. Nothing can be accomplished here, moreover, without mobilizing the peasants. And in addition to the scattering of the departments when it comes to village action, in the majority of countries, itinerant rural development agents preach the good word about modernization and village cooperation with hardly any results, for lack of follow-up and realism, doubtless, but also for lack of support on the part of other departments.

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Some of the countries have tried to correct the scattered nature of the campaigns on the village level by organizing "integrated operations." Cameroon has had its own, as has the Central African Republic, Congo, Mali, Niger, with its aforementioned 3M project, Upper Volta, with the establishment of the Rural Development Organization (ORD), which integrate all the departments concerned with rural life at the base level. Technical campaigns, farmer training, encouragement of rural craft activities, health and social projects can thus proceed in harmony. But as we said in connection with the 3M project, these operations are always based on priority for the development of marketable production. This goal, always taking precedence over the others, is not in itself a goal of development for the rural sector, and very often even works against balanced development.

III-Adapted Program

Could the situation be otherwise? As they have been conceived, the programs require heavy investments, generally covered by credits of foreign origin, including the IBRD, USAID and EDF [European Development Fund], for the repayment of which plans must be laid. The "experts" affiliated with the bodies, who are generally very closely involved in the drafting of the projects (when the whole of the concept is not their work) always plan for heavy and speedy production to make the investments "profitable." This concern, in the majority of cases, eliminates any consideration of the ecosystem balance and the priority needs of the inhabitants, food requirements in particular, as well as concern with the peasants' participation. If it is true that not all of the programs, like the wheat project in Adamaoua, Cameroon, exclude the peasants, it is in no way an exaggeration to say that none is based on the requirement of satisfying their priority needs to feed, clothe and house themselves and educate their children. Under these conditions, one cannot be surprised that many of these programs bog down in a few years, once the "experts," equipped with heavy resources, who made them operate, have departed. Marketing difficulties, a failure to maintain what has been achieved and general disinterest are the fate of the projects whose single dimension fails to take into account the overall and participational nature of true development.

Nor can one be surprised that the "priority for agriculture" incorporated in the prefaces to a number of African national development plans proves, when it comes to evaluation, to have been nothing more than a pious wish or incantation. On the one hand, difficulties are often encountered in finding financing for the projects announced. On the other hand, doubtless for lack of adaptation to the reality, projects very often lag in their progress. With equal frequency, mainly because of structural and organizational reasons, the national agricultural departments fail to use up the credit allocated to them. It is so much easier to build a factory and get it operating than to invest in agriculture! And in fact, the planners regard agriculture as if they were confronted with an operational plant the production of which should be strictly consistent with the investments made therein. Now this plant (if agriculture could ever be regarded as such) is not in functional condition. It is in fact precisely in a state of breakdown. It is the very structure of rural life, destroyed by the colonial economy, which needs to be rebuilt before expecting to make it function satisfactorily and profitably.

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If this is not done, the peasant, already uprooted culturally, has no option remaining but to plan to leave for the city or to go abroad in the hope, in most cases illusory, of finding a steady job.

Deterioration of Cultivation Systems

This profound deterioration in the structures of rural life emerges clearly when one considers the cultivation systems used in the majority of the black African countries. Outdated today, they are not, however, successfully being altered, as if the internal development spring of the rural societies had broken and their capacity to innovate had been stifled. A basic element in crop raising systems is rotation, the succession in time of cultivation and fallow periods. In South Cameroon, in the equatorial forest zone, 3 years of cultivation alternate with a fallow forestry period which lasts at least 7 years, with burning of the area at the end of the cycle. Reestablishment of the soil is effected by the trees and the perennial plants in the fallow period, which draw from the deep soil layer to enrich the surface layer. The leguminous varieties among these plant species enrich the soil with nitrogen. Sheltered from erosion by the rain and sun, the humus can thus rebuilt itself before a new cultivation cycle is undertaken.

In Upper Volta, in the Sudan-Sahel zone, 10 years of crop raising alternate with 10 years lying fallow as savannah, used for animal pasturage and then burned. In Togo, on the Danyi Plateau, a savannah on which there is tree growth with patches of forest, 8 to 15 years of lying fallow follow every 8 years of cultivation on burnt-off land. In the river region in Niger, the traditional system involves 6 years of crop cultivation followed by 6 years of lying fallow as savannah. We say involved, for this system no longer functions. The population of the region has become too dense for the system to remain viable. In fact, with an average yield of 300 kg of millet per hectare, an average of 0.8 hectares is needed to feed one inhabitant. Taking the traditional system of fallow years into account, one would thus need 1.6 hectare of arable area per inhabitant, half of it under cultivation and the other half lying fallow. Conversely, if the population density were to exceed one inhabitant per 1.6 hectare of arable land, or 63 inhabitants per arable square km, the traditional system would no longer be viable, for lack of sufficient area. As the arable land represents about half of the total, our density limit is 30 inhabitants per total square km area. In the river zone, population densities, which have already reached about 50 inhabitants per square km, explain the inevitable abandonment of the traditional system. In practice, the fallow period has simply been eliminated. The peasants raise millet crop after millet crop, compensating more or less for the decline in fertility by the use of the organic manure provided by the sheep and goats kept by the Peul herdsmen on crop fields after harvest. The traditional system has disappeared, but it has not really been replaced by a more intensive one. It is a matter only of patching up the old system, which is in any case inadequate to prevent the progressive deterioration of the subsoil due to the effect of chemical and physical erosion. In fact, the fertility of certain areas has declined to the extent that they are no longer cultivated. A peasant, asked about the past development of a plateau area near his village, answered: "Millet was raised here in the past and it produced well. We cannot do that any more today: the land has aged, like the rest of us."

In the Danyi sector of Togo, the traditional fallow periods have also been shortened. A decline in fertility can be observed. Some peasants are forced to purchase foodstuffs from the residents of the plains, which never occurred in the past. Diseases are affecting cassava which might well be for lack of nourishment. In the Eton sector of Cameroon, to the north of Yaounde, where population densities of 100 inhabitants per square km are not uncommon, the practice of leaving land fallow has almost disappeared. This ancient forest, in an advanced stage of conversion to savannah, also is characterized by often much deteriorated and practically sterile soils.

In all of these cases, the traditional cultivation system, with the alternation of crops and fallow years as forest or savannah, is no longer viable. Everywhere it will become less and less viable as the population increases. Simply shortening the fallow period, without altering its nature, means deterioration of the soil within a more or less short period.

The Needed Agricultural Revolution

It is necessary to change the system of cultivation, in the direction of intensification: cultivation followed by fallow periods in pastureland, plowed under rather than burned, making it possible to shorten the fallow period without reducing fertility. It is not a question only of introducing a new element into the old system. In fact, if a short herbaceous fallow period is wanted, it is necessary to plow it under at the end of the cycle instead of burning it in order to recover as much organic material as possible. For plowing fallow land under, the "daba" thus no longer suffices. Plows and draft animals are needed. Oxen would, moreover, provide fertilizer, very useful for the crops, but which the farmers must learn to compost instead of leaving it to lose half of its value in the sun. The spread of plowing with draft animals in a village will increase the water needs. New well, perhaps necessitating drilling, will be required. The village smiths will also have to learn to repair the new type of plows and harrows. An increase in village storage capacity will have to accompany the increase in production. All these things go together, and it is this complex one can call an agricultural revolution. It must be disseminated in Africa today, with priority over every other concern, and with the food supply for the people and the ecological balance as the primary goals.

With this requirement in view, it is clear that the development of peanut or cotton crops within a traditional system of cultivation in which no other factor is changed accelerates the exhaustion of the soil and its vulnerability to all forms of erosion. It is also clear that scattered popularization campaigns resulting from ready-made concepts about the techniques to be used and the peasant mentality do not take into account the various complementary fields of action and can have only negative effects. Now generally speaking, the agricultural programs do not correspond to the various and complementary requirements of an agricultural revolution. They are conceived to produce as much and as quickly as possible at the least cost.

Those who are called upon to draft such programs are trained in this same approach. It is difficult to find in Africa an agricultural school or development institute which integrates education on human nutrition and diet or

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ecology in the training provided. Rural economics is taught, as in Europe, solely in relation to marketable production and the acquisition of monetary assets. It does not take into account the deterioration of the land under the effects of erosion, nor the decline in the labor force due to malnutrition. Economics thus viewed must be denounced as a fallacious representation of reality and economic education must be closely linked with the study of ecology which pertains to the reproduction of the land and the study of human nutrition, which is not a health problem, but the very foremost of economic problems.⁸

Village Projects and Peasant Revolution

If the development programs frequently fail to work, when one compares them with the goals, the failure is the more serious if we take into account the social objectives which should always have priority, to wit, guaranteeing each individual, thanks to his labor, satisfaction of his needs, beginning with the right to each one's fill. The situation will remain the same as long as matters are viewed from the point of view of the profitability of monetary investments alone and production marketing, rather than the needs and the potential of local populations. When the Inter-State Committee To Fight the Drought in the Sahel (CILSS) says that the priority in the Sahel is water resources, and builds a whole dam construction program on that basis, it is forgetting that the priority of priorities is to enable a presently undernourished population to feed itself thanks to its own efforts by reestablishing its natural environment which is in an accelerated state of deterioration. The priority is to mobilize people, not to build dams. There is no lack, moreover, of dams in the Sahel which are not being used, for example those built through the EDF program in Upper Volta, not to mention such bitter failures as Irhazar in Niger, or those probably in store in Senegal.

In the majority of the African countries, village projects for which the peasants are responsible, often sponsored by private aid sources, point to other possible solutions, linking increased food production with the perfecting of service crafts (smiths, weavers), the education of children rooted in the rural world, and the training of local nurses. Such projects can readily do without international aid, although launching them requires some credit. They alone, because they are situated on the village level and seek to involve all the peasants, can put to work the principles of an agricultural revolution designed to rely to the greatest possible extent on the creation of nonagricultural jobs in the rural sector itself, within the logic of a complementary scheme. These principles call for priority concern for the most difficult regions (whereas in general, planning projects focus priority concern on the richest zones). Then an effort must be made to understand, through a knowledge of the territory and its population, how the present ethno-ecosystem works, in other words, what the interaction of the inhabitants among themselves and with their environment are. Through a series of assessments, it is necessary to estimate food production, how it is distributed in time and space, and to study the environmental problems, erosion and declining fertility in particular. A careful examination must be given the demographic situation and its development. The adaptation of the food and job potential to the current and potential demand must be contemplated, and concern must be devoted to nonagricultural jobs likely to be created, above all where farm employment already seems saturated, as is seen for example in Burundi, Rwanda, the Bamileke and Eton sectors of

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Cameroon, certain regions in Togo, and as will be seen increasingly in Africa in the next 25 years.

It will then be necessary to see what the priority actions to be undertaken might be. If, for example, a majority of deficit food balances is found among the families of a village in which the basic nourishment is provided by millet, which has a very low yield per unit of surface, moreover, for example 300 kg per hectare, a search for a way to increase this production, within the balance of the whole of the system, would be clearly indicated. It will be necessary to establish whether by improved methods some peasants are not already obtaining better than average results, as is often the case. These improved methods would obviously be those indicated for generalization which, moreover, often proves easier than the inauguration of more sophisticated methods developed on the basis of the experience of the classic research stations.

It will be necessary to work with the village groups responsible for campaigns pursued on this level, such as for example to estimate the grain needs, the corresponding production and the progress year after year. Thus little by little it will be possible to modify the cultivation system by intensification, while respecting the ecosystem balance. "Water resources" will then take on their full meaning, because we will know precisely to what crops to allocate the water supply and the means of guaranteeing it at the lowest cost for the peasants will have been studied. We are speaking here only of food supply: health, housing and education should also be the focus of projects paralleling the former and correlated with them.

Eliminating Colonial Trade

International financial aid and the experts generally provided along with this aid are likely to be very little interested in this kind of project, which does not place the stress on export production or products marketable in substantial quantities, at least in the first years of functioning. Such programs, moreover, do not generally require costly water pumps, concrete dams or substantial infrastructure projects which the peasants could not amortize and would thus be unable to manage. All of this equipment of foreign origin is paid for in fact by aid which, as is known, serves first of all to assist the industries in the country of origin. But above all, it must be expected that such projects will bring in little foreign exchange. As a result, a country which adopts a rural policy inspired by these principles must also ask its government employees to accept a standard of living much below that of their Western counterparts. Such a country would have to cease to have recourse to foreign aid which is not oriented to the development of such a model. It would have to break with the traditional thinking of the leading classes, with the industrial ideology, and with the colonial market system--that would indeed be a revolution!

The implementation of such cultural and political revolutions does not depend, moreover, only on the will of the peoples of Africa. It presumes that active minorities in Europe and in the West more generally would undertake to work for the drastic elimination of the colonial trade system. The need to place less reliance on the industrial raw materials from the African countries, the labor of their peasants and their land would require our companies to

limit their waste, their material growth and also to make better use of their own resources. It is obviously not this path which is being pursued today in the European policies with regard to Africa, with the reiteration of the fact that Europe needs us as we need it. But can Africa, which has not, and for good reason, had colonies to develop, undertake the path of its own development, which is based on colonization, and relies today on redeployment in the Third World? The solution to the problems of hunger and full employment in Africa does not lie in the extensive economic model used by the colonial nations, which cannot do without the constant absorption of new space. It lies in an intensive model of use of our own resources in labor, raw materials and land, which means that these must not be plundered to the advantage of foreign beneficiaries. Utopia? Yes indeed, but when the only alternative is the broader spread of famine, contemplation of it is nonetheless worthwhile.

FOOTNOTES

1. Diulde Laya, "Listening to the Peasants and Livestock Breeders of the Sahel," ENVIRONNEMENT AFRICAINE, Dakar, April 1975.
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3. Herve Derriennic, "Famine and Domination in Black Africa--The Peasants and Livestock Breeders of the Sahel Under the Yoke," L'Harmattan, Paris.
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OUEDDEI DENIED ENTRY INTO NIGERIA--Lagos, 8 Jun (REUTER)--Goukouni Oueddei, the Chadian president who was driven from his capital, wanted to flee to Nigeria yesterday, Monday, when Hissene Habre's FAN entered Ndjamena but the authorization to enter Nigerian territory was denied him by the government, official sources said on Tuesday in Lagos. It is further indicated that the former president has probably fled to Cameroon. The same source adds that Goukouni Oueddei had asked the commanders of the OAU peacekeeping force stationed in Chad to intervene in his behalf as the rebel forces approached the capital. This appeal was also rejected and the Nigerian troops in the peacekeeping force which also comprises Senegalese and Zairian soldiers, received orders to remain neutral and fight only if attacked, the same sources indicated. [Text] [AB081343 London REUTER in French 1324 GMT 8 Jun 82]

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IVORY COAST

ECONOMIC SITUATION, POSSIBILITY OF RECOVERY DISCUSSED

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 26 Apr-9 May 82 pp 26-30

[Article by Koffi Mamane: "The 'Ivorian Miracle' Put to the Test"]

[Text] Sparkling, ultramodern, bristling with skyscrapers and other buildings, the Abidjan Plateau, the administrative and commercial district, is motionless during this month of April 1982. The giant cranes and excavators are idle and the projects which, throughout the past decade, turned the downtown area of the Ivorian capital into another Rio de Janeiro are at a standstill, perhaps only temporarily.

Like the building and construction industry, the economy of the Ivory Coast is going through the difficult times of recession. The "situation," an "in word" somewhat tinged with the caustic humor of the lower class people, is assuredly difficult.

At the root of what can only be called an economic crisis, even if national officials insist on emphasizing its completely temporary, passing nature, is the steady drop, year after year, of export receipts since 1979: from 800 billion CFA francs a year to 400 billion. That which may have been tolerable in neighboring countries takes on the look of a catastrophe here, or at least of a serious shock that opens one's eyes and awakens Ivorians from a long and peaceful sleep, a sleep made all the more profound by nearly 20 years of an "economic miracle."

In Africa, the Ivory Coast is definitely not just another country! While it may have enjoyed a deep sleep, the awakening is restless. President Felix Houphouet-Boigny's fellow citizens have constantly brought up their difficulties, their trying situation. Quite obviously, it is the lower-income groups that have been the hardest hit, as in the case of the taxi driver who, a worried look on his face, begins his long complaint: "A year ago, all I needed was four liters of gas in order to start making a profit. Now, I have to use up as much as five or six before I find my first customer. Middle income people, my usual customers, are now forced to use public transportation, to take the bus." His math is perhaps a little exaggerated, but it nevertheless illustrates the difficulties and spectre of the future that are on the minds of Ivorians in what may euphemistically be called the "less favored" categories.

He went on, growing more precise in his explanations: "Six months ago, the price of a liter of gas suddenly went from 475 to 525 CFA francs. At the same time, the basic price on the meter went from 80 to 100 francs. Every 330 meters, the price on the meter would go up 30 instead of 20 francs."

Obviously, in absolute terms, these figures are not at all impressive, but when added together, they seriously begin to discourage the user. Like the driver, the rider gets less and less out of it, especially since the result is a rate of inflation of about 20 percent, a figure close to the official national average last year.

It is not only the taxis that are enduring the difficulties. Many population groups in Abidjan or the other large cities in the country which maintained a high standard of living are now forced to give up certain leisure activities that had become an integral and important part of their way of life.

In the heart of the lower-income district of Treichville, a large Muslim family could not afford the usual festivities celebrating the baptism of a newborn child, the supreme sacrifice. "It's the situation," commented a prominent member of the household.

For some, the rising cost of living is even more dreadful. Unlike their Malian, Voltan or Guinean neighbors, the Ivorians have grown accustomed to eating outside the home, at one of the innumerable *maquis* in the urban compounds. However, between 1979 and 1982, the cost of the excellent *kedjenou* chicken, cooked by steam, went from 500 to 1,500 CFA francs, a dizzying increase of 300 percent!

"Ah! This 'Situation'!"

Naturally, not all widely consumed products have gone up so much. And yet, every increase, coming at a time of a very clear slowdown in economic activity, can only help make the "situation" even more difficult, for the "economically less well-off" as well as for those who for decades have acquired a taste for Western-type living. One executive told us: "With my wife, who is a teacher in a public high school, we earn about 1 million CFA francs a month. It is a lot, but believe me, we do not save a thing." Furthermore, this is a family without children that pays little attention to the ritual African solidarity of the "expanded family." The couple's income goes for maintaining their car (15,000 to 20,000 francs a month), telephone bills (the unit price of an urban telephone call is 100 CFA francs, nearly four times higher than the rate in Paris!) and the merciless bills of the water and electrical companies.

Mr and Mrs Koffi are not on the list of the "economically poor": Their monthly income is on the order of 200,000 CFA francs. Naturally, they have grown accustomed to having a fine table, wines -- of an average quality -- aperitifs, after-dinner drinks, and other delicacies were rarely lacking. While the standard of living and level of expenditures would indicate a totally bourgeois family, what one has is actually nothing but a question of status. Elsewhere, in the West, the Koffis would be nothing more or less than true representatives of the real middle class.

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The slowdown in economic activity does not only affect those whom the scientific classification of peoples labels as "lower low" (uncertain income), "upper low" (they enjoy a better fate than those in the previous category) or "upper middle" (socioprofessional groups that are better off). For the past 2 or 3 years, the rate of investments has clearly slowed down. Worried over a continuing recession, both national and foreign businessmen hesitate to take risks, to say the least. Public investments, 12 percent of the gross national product (GNP) in 1979, now make up only 7 to 8 percent. Officials do not hide the fact that the drop will accentuate in the next 2 years. Already, business failures are legion in Abidjan. "And some over a few tens of thousands of francs," one economic official told us privately.

The fact is that the government has taken the harshest possible measures in order to meet the crisis. Among them are: very short-term payment, by ailing enterprises, of back taxes; strict control of bank credit, so strict that it sometimes endangers enterprises whose finances are shaky or not quite sound. As a result, the ranks of the unemployed, already inflated by the liquidation of dozens of national companies in 1981-1981, are even fatter.

They are joined by those freshly out of the university whom the "economic miracle" can no longer accommodate. According to official statistics, a thousand new graduates at the master's level could find no jobs on the national labor market in 1981.

Faithful -- to the point of intransigency -- to the doctrine of economic liberalism that has so far guided his action and ensured its success, the regime of President Houphouet-Boigny is curbing the government's "life style" with cuts that cannot fail to leave victims, beginning with the social successes that, to date, have given a particular *cachet* to Ivorian capitalism. Among them is national education which, a rare thing in the sub-Sahara region of Africa, takes 40 percent of the national budget. To its credit, 70 percent of all Ivorians attend school (compared with 45 percent in Senegal and the same in Cameroon) and the number of high schools and institutions of higher learning rose from 34 in 1960 to 114 in 1979. At the same time, the number of elementary schools leaped from 300 to over 1,000.

In addition, a system of scholarships offering between 40,000 and 90,000 CFA francs a month -- and which has few equivalents in Black Africa -- has heretofore protected students from urgent need. What is more, half of the scholarship is paid monthly to the student's wife. His housing costs between 2,500 and 3,000 francs and the government subsidizes meal tickets, paying 800 francs while the user pays 75.

Nor is that all: A boarding school system for thousands of children of the "economically poor" exists throughout the country. However, at the end of the first quarter of 1982, the Ministry of National Education announced a sweeping reform of the boarding school system, a reform moving in the direction of its transfer to private ownership. Naturally, there is no lack of arguments justifying the turning out into the streets of thousands of boys and girls who will now be turned over to the responsibility of parents caught up in the "situation." At a press conference in Abidjan on 25 March, Minister of

National Education Paul Akoto Yao noted that out of the 4.6 billion CFA francs allocated for the 140,000 elementary school children, 3.9 billion -- about 85 percent -- helped only 23,000 boys and girls that were actually boarders. In reality, it is more a question of giving up a policy that was costly but positive in its results, than of a "work of justice." After all, inasmuch as the boarding school situation is nothing new, the ministry in question could have become aware of the "injustice" well before the "situation" and fight its harmful effects!

Under such conditions, how can one not think of an outright liquidation resulting from the new wind of economic realism blowing over the Ivory Coast?

"The liberal system in which we live authorizes every person to set up his own private boarding school, so that reform of the boarding school system means nothing more than a transfer to private ownership," we were told by a teacher at a private school in Adjame, one of the "African" quarters (that is, non-residential) of the capital. It is a frightening prospect in these hard times, for during the past years of the "fatted calf," it was notoriously well-known that the administration of some establishments left something to be desired. We know that the government spared no effort to subsidize private schools, among other reasons, so that they would provide a substantial income for the "privileged ones" of the regime, the teachers, whose salaries, in secondary schools and universities, range from 371,000 to 742,000 CFA francs. According to one of these "privileged persons," these quarterly subsidies varied between 100 and 300 million CFA francs, depending on the size of the institution. Our interlocutor condemned veritable "misappropriations of funds" by some school officials, who engage in real estate speculation more than they concern themselves with paying salaries to their employees on time."

In Treichville, Adjame, Marcori or Bormakote, rumors run rampant, fed by the official silence. Measures are being drafted to dismantle the public health system. At any rate, hospital equipment is already outdated and old and there is no hope for new in the foreseeable future.

It was such grumbling, within a definitely difficult situation, that in February, brought about the hottest social alert in the young history of the independent Ivory Coast, when students took to the streets, for reasons more political than financial, it must be admitted. While these movements at no time threatened -- contrary to first impressions -- the regime of the "Old Man," there is nothing to guarantee that the next time, they will not spread to the unhealthy districts of Sanfil, for example. These are districts which, as everyone is aware, are riddled with crime and which are therefore potential powder kegs.

Together, the "situation" and economic neorealism, joined with a greater thirst for freedom expression born of the opening desired by the chief of state (see AFRIQUE-ASIE, No 260, 1-14 March 1982). came as a revelation, warning that nothing would be as it was before. Politicians (beginning with the president of the republic), businessmen, intellectuals and simple citizens became aware of the fragile nature of a newly acquired prosperity.

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While political and economic officials hasten to plan the recovery and to meet the most urgent needs, the man on the street has been bitten by the bug of politics. The *maquis* and other bars in Abidjan are becoming new temples where there are heated discussions of politics and economics, of the fate and future of the country and its children. "Bock," the king of beers, flows freely as these lively discussions turn into the new feature of the Ivorian social scene. This is all the more important because it marks the boundaries of a deliberate policy of apoliticization of Ivorians followed for two decades, a policy which, relentlessly and with *panache*, set out to make money the only value worthy of the name. It is perhaps because money has become so scarce that the Old Man's flock has acquired such a taste for discussions of government!

As a result, the condition of the poor man, that bizarre being previously among the most highly scorned in the Ivory Coast, is now claimed by those who tried, legitimately, but in vain, to flee it: "I am the son of a poor man and proud of it," says one of the most popular songs in Abidjan. Furthermore, songs with a message, long lost in the flow of romantic ballads, are now the ones Ivorians like the most. Is it a sign of the times? Perhaps.

Future

It is perhaps also a sign of the inevitable "post-Houphouet" period, which all politicians anticipate without mentioning and for which a number of "young wolves," the big shots of the regime, are fanatically preparing for. Powerful clans are now being formed with an eye to the prospect, more on ethnoregional bases than on political proposals. When the Old Man does finally step down, this could endanger the work of national unification and exchange security so patiently put in place by the founder of the Ivory Coast of today. With the renewed enthusiasm of an old fighter, he has personally frozen political fighting, calming the impatience of those aspiring to succeed him. "When Houphouet-Boigny is no longer there to contain the centrifugal forces and the strong personal ambitions, our country will experience its growth crisis, perhaps even the entry of the army onto the political scene," one journalist completely won over to the government policy somberly predicts. He adds that "the most difficult thing will be to maintain the cohesion of the single party, the Democratic Party of the Ivory Coast (PDCI-RDA [African Democratic Rally]) and above all, to make it a mass party" instead of the current elitist group.

Beyond the disturbing nature of this prospect, which could be contradicted by the events -- as has occurred in other places -- these remarks nevertheless illustrate an irreversible reality: The Ivorian people are thinking calmly and seriously about their future, less and less content to delegate their vote.

Keys to Recovery

"Houphouet-Boigny laid the foundations for Ivorian prosperity. It is up to his heirs and future successors to maintain what has been achieved!" The speaker, one close to the regime, is not given to understatement! A good disciple, he has confidence in what he says. It is true that, in 22 years of

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African independence, few nations, whether progressive or conservative, can boast such a positive balance sheet as that of the Ivory Coast. Did the average annual per capital income not go, between 1960 and 1980, from \$100 to \$740, placing the country right after the oil-producing states such as Libya, Algeria and Gabon, the latter having seven times fewer people than the Ivory Coast? Even better, with an annual growth rate of about 7 percent, this unusual tropical country exhibits a feat admitted by even the most bitter adversaries of the "Old Man," a feat that brings it close to nations such as South Korea or oil-rich Mexico, which have spectacular growth.

Furthermore, nations such as Senegal or Cameroon (by way of example), which got off to a better start and which benefited more from colonization, can no longer compete with the Ivory Coast of today. Houphouet-Boigny's country has many other advantages: a road system which, with respect to communications, makes it the brightest jewel in the southern Sahara; two ocean shipping companies: SITRAM [Ivorian Marine Transport Company] and SIVOMAR [expansion unknown], which can compete with the most modern enterprises of the type, giving the Ivory Coast relative autonomy in the field of international dealing. Since 1978, SITRAM and SIVOMAR have brought in nearly 76 billion CFA francs a year for the country.

Another asset: a very real industrialization which, when one combines large trusts with the small and medium-size enterprises, employs several tens of thousands of workers. Above all, there is its commercial agriculture, whose mainstays are wood, coffee and cacao, with these three providing some 70 percent of the nation's export receipts. In this agroindustrial field, one is, all things considered and without yielding to the magic of figures, in the presence of a feat. From its position as a modest producer upon its accession to independence, the Ivory Coast has now hoisted itself up to third place in the world (first in Africa) for coffee and first place in the world for cacao, leaving Ghana, formerly the titleholder, far behind, experiencing unspeakable difficulties. Coffee and cacao provide the country with nearly 500,000 tons a year, while cotton and peanuts are experiencing spectacular progress.

There is also farming for food: yams and other sweet potatoes, pineapples, bananas, and so on, which cover the country's essential needs, while the Ivory Coast, through an unprecedented effort, managed in just a few years to halt all rice imports, a new food from the north and which has won over all the people in the south.

Is this growth or development? Is the latter possible without the former? Those who once posed the question are now forced, not only to make the distinction, but especially to exercise caution.

At the root of the "Ivorian miracle" are naturally the political choices of Felix Houphouet-Boigny, a choice already gestating when, in the middle of the 1950's, that rich Baoule planter who wanted to succeed the French settlers in handling Ivorian affairs, "broke off" from the communist group in the French Parliament. Moreover, he was more forced to lead his country to independence than he accepted it himself, this for obvious economic reasons

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because for him, while one cannot succeed without money, one can do everything with it, even buy souls or freedom!

At the time, "H.B.," as he is commonly called, went against the grain of those holding to a central idea that moved hearts: "Rather freedom and dignity with poverty than luxury under foreign domination." Perhaps H. B. wanted to reconcile the two terms of the alternative -- a dangerous exercise -- because he had understood (only too well?) the complexity of the modern world and the interdependence of nations. Whatever the case, following independence, he proclaimed and put into practice capitalist choices which, by virtue of their clarity, confused the most fervent followers of the liberal model. In substance, he told the Ivorian people: "Make money first and forget all the rest." He plunged into the Western system as deeply as possible after choosing dependency. He bet everything on export products, opened wide the doors of his country to foreign investors, but also to notorious looters. At home, he worked toward the emergence of a class of businessmen (often politicians) with unlimited aggressiveness and voraciousness. Consequently, he created a capitalist nation worthy of the name headed by the very men who could ensure the vigor of the economy and vice versa.

The system resulted in resources and a surplus that financed growth, made it possible to create a "social capitalism" and contributed to political stability, which in turn helped the growth of the economy and attracted millions of foreigners.

But there is also another side to the coin. Social disparities are shocking: Skyscrapers stand next to shanties, impressive highways for wealthy car owners cross miserable shantytowns overpopulated and riddled with crime, both petty and major. The penniless continue to slave for millionaires and multimillionaires.

Finally, acculturation is very real, which sooner or later results in cultural demands.

Inversely, the government provides itself with the means of a relative political autonomy. One might even wonder, of the Ivory Coast or the "political giant" which Senegal is, which of the two now enjoys the means of that autonomy, which uses them the best.

And yet, it was realized that the whole edifice, too greatly patterned after the Western economy, was fragile. It is precisely the economic and world crisis (and the wheeling and dealing of Giscardian France) that threatens to ruin the "Ivorian miracle." This explains why, in the solutions being drafted as part of the 1981-1985 Plan, the government gives the impression of having understood the limitations of the model. But, caught up in the trap of its political choices, it nevertheless continues to work within the framework of furthering its relations with international capital. This policy provides for an average growth in export agriculture of 5.5 percent; unprecedented modernization of market gardening, which is now bearing fruit in terms of productivity; the upgrading of livestock raising; revival of building which, thanks to the

Ivorian Construction and Property Management Company (SICOGI, 65-percent government controlled), made it possible to build 35,000 housing units in 8 years, including 25,000 low-income units (SICOGI "rent" of 1,500 to 3,000 CFA francs a month for a three- or four-room apartment is common). To top it off, the government basès great hopes on oil, which is already meeting half of the nation's needs, an estimated 600,000 tons a year. The Ivory Coast hopes to export the "black gold" in 2 years. It will be one of the keys to recovery. Will it be enough to ensure that the Ivorian system can demonstrate its effectiveness? Or will it be but one more respite given to the economy of this country, which essentially depends on the multinational companies?

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TANZANIA

BRIEFS

RABIES KILLS 12—Dar es Salaam, 9 Jun (REUTER)—At least 12 people have died of rabies and (?more) are critically ill in the northern Kilimanjaro region of Tanzania, the official Tanzania News Agency reported today. There is no anti-rabies vaccine in the entire region and no bullets available to shoot stray dogs, cats and squirrels, the agency quoted regional medical officer E.E. Kiwelu as saying. "In fact, (the sick) are at home dying quietly. Some of them are already dead," he said, adding that he had asked the government to order the army to shoot strays. Tanzania cannot afford to import vaccines or ammunition due to the country's current economic crisis, the agency reported. [Text] [AB091001 London REUTER in English 0823 GMT 9 Jun 82]

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ZAIRE

MILITARY ACTION ONLY HOPE FOR CHANGE IN KINSHASA

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 263, 12-25 Apr 82 pp 30-31

/Report on interview with Francois Lumumba, secretary general of the revived MNC/L /Congolesse National Movement/Lumumba/, by Antonia Blis, date and place not given/.

/Text/ Mobutu repression has never been able to completely silence the struggle or the aspirations of the Zairian people for independence and freedom. But after crushing the resistance (inspired by the National Liberation Council) which followed the assassination of Patrice Lumumba, it succeeded in creating such a situation that the patriotic forces (and, consequently their leaders) have been kept isolated a long time from each other. That cannot but explain, in any case partly, the extreme dispersion which still characterizes the Zairian opposition today, all of whose members proclaim, however, with more or less sincerity and for purposes which are not always--far from it--identical, the need to unite in a single front all those who want to end the destructive regime of Mobutu Sese Seko.

In January 1981, on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the death of Patrice Lumumba, a group of members, among them Francois Emery and Julienne Lumumba, son and daughter of the former assassinated prime minister, announced in Brussels the revival of the MNC/L.* According to the organizers, this initiative was the result of coordination carried out for some time with members inside the country.

One of the proclaimed objectives of the revived MNC/L, whose secretary general is Francois Emery Lumumba, is to reorganize "the alliance of Lumumba forces", with the latter becoming the central nucleus of a broader front uniting all those who want not only to end "Mobutism" but also facilitate a radical change in Congo-Kinshasa.

Certainly, the sponsors of the MNC/L who, at the time of the public inauguration of their effort, had introduced their party's manifesto in broad outline, had no illusions about the extent or difficulty of the task. They also warned it would be a long range project.

*See AFRIQUE-ASIE, No 235 of 16-29 March 1981

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A year afterwards, where is the revived MNC/L which Francois Emery Lumumba leads? It is understandable that it is not possible to draw up a concrete balance, if only because the clandestine situation of the members who remained in the country demands a minimum of caution. But, if the original members of the MNC /Congolese National Movement/ (founded by Patrice Lumumba in 1958), such as Mathias Crispin Kemishanga* have supported Francois Emery Lumumba's undertaking and if the contacts between one and the other continue, we confirm that the process of reunification around the revived MNC/L, which is intended to be the "cornerstone of the building" is still an objective to be attained.

"The founding of a political party having clear objectives, which take into account both the characteristics of the domestic and foreign situation, is a necessity if we want to get the country out of the bankruptcy in which it is involved, free it from foreign control and lead it towards a society of genuine justice and democracy, the leaders of the revived MNC/L say in short, but we want to learn the lessons of the experiences of the years 1964-1965.

"As the son of Patrice Lumumba, I could mobilize people, the secretary general of the revived MNC/L declares. But it should not be a question of starting pitched battles, in no matter what conditions, which would lead to a failure for which we would be responsible. This is why we believe that in the immediate future, priority action consists in raising the consciousness of the masses in depth. It is necessary, when they come to us, that the people know why. We have marked out some positions on the level of this work of consciousness raising. Thousands of copies of our party's manifesto have been distributed, both inside as well as outside the country. In fact, we are carrying out a great work of information in Africa and the Arab countries and we have made many productive contacts with friendly countries and movements.

"As for the distribution of the manifesto inside Zaire, you can imagine the courage and intelligence it has demanded on the part of our members. And in spite of the arrests made on this occasion, we can believe that this information work was carried out successfully."

*See insert

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ZAIRE

LEADERS PLUNDER ZAIRE'S FALTERING ECONOMY

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 263, 12-25 Apr 82 pp 30-31

[Article by Pierre Clary: "A Pillaged Economy"]

[Text] It seems futile to again emphasize the weaknesses of Zaire's economy: the internal disorganization, foreign indebtedness, the existence of foreign companies...But it certainly is interesting to show the process of deterioration which has continued for 20 years. Thus Zaire's economy has followed a cycle which brings it today to a level lower than that of 1960: this is the thesis of three Belgian research workers who describe these last 20 years as those of "accumulation and underdevelopment."*

In 20 years, a bureaucratic class has managed to infiltrate all the country's economic and commercial mechanisms, not to take in hand, control or develop the process of accumulation, but to literally appropriate the surplus for themselves personally. State intervention in the economic field has been transformed into a general surrender of principle which has allowed the diversion of all agricultural, industrial and commercial processes from their economic purpose.

On the basis of that, all the so-called development projects become financial abysses, since, by nature they cannot achieve any tangible economic result. In the case of a textile plant project designed to use local cotton production, we find almost total imports of raw cotton to get the plant to operate at a reduced rate. The same phenomenon has taken place in the metallurgical sector and in many others.

Until 1974, the bureaucratic class claimed to make productive investments, the investments actually were sizeable in value. But, in fact, all this equipment concealed a complete inability to put a diversified economy in operation. The development of public financing only had the purpose of favoring a fully expanding commercial

*Fernand Bezy, Jean-Phillipe Peemans and Jean Marie Wautelet:
"Accumulation and Underdevelopment in Zaire, 1960-1980," Louvain University Press (UCL), Louvain-la-Neuve 1981

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sector. But in Zaire, a large part of the embezzlements of funds made by the ruling class is recorded for bookkeeping purposes under this sector term. Since it was no longer possible to continue this policy starting in 1973--because of the combination of the rise in price of petroleum and manufactured products and the drop in copper--this class plunged into a series of actions and liquidations which all had as a common denominator the lack of long term objectives.

Because of the economic policy which it chose to establish its power--control of the domestic and foreign trade networks--, this bourgeoisie has no control of the economic apparatus on which it prefers to increase its piratical interventions. This policy was expressed by "zairianization" (1973), which consisted in redistributing small and medium scale capital--agriculture, trade, services--to the national bourgeoisie through the subterfuge of an acceleration of credits granted to the private sector. Starting with the next year, it was "radicalization"--after confirming the "failure" of "zairianization"--aiming at increasing the state's role in the economic sector. In fact this operation permits a perfect osmosis between political and administrative power and commercial functions.

But political power at this time no longer has sufficient financial means to maintain the illusion of any productive role. Capital expenditures in the state budget rise from 108 million zaires in 1974 to 129 million in 1979, while at the same time current expenses increase from 537 million to 2.166 billion. International financing becomes indispensable to continue the system of domestic and foreign privilege. The foreign debt has increased fourfold between 1974 and 1979, but the management of this indebtedness leaves nothing to chance, with the Zairian state being careful to distribute this debt between the western countries: the United States, France, Belgium and the FRG.

In view of this situation, all the creditors concentrate their attention on mining copper and cobalt which is the favored method for the ruling class to preserve its international credibility. Now the rise in the price of copper and that of cobalt since 1979 have made it possible to ward off financial disaster, with Zaire exporting besides much more cobalt in value than copper.

The game, for the international financiers who are involved in Zairian public finances, consists then in measuring out the distribution of income between, on one hand, the repayment of the debt and the renewal of the mining investments and, on the other hand, providing the bureaucratic class with income which insures the system's stability.

On the social level, the results exceed everything that could be expected. The three authors have calculated that "on the eve of the First World War, the Congolese workers were twice better paid than

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the present Zairian workers." In 20 years of independence, the standard of living has deteriorated by 80 to 90 percent! Today, Zaire no longer has a national economy. What remains of it are agricultural operations which hardly provide the minimum of self-sufficiency in rural areas, with the cities being supplied with imports. Manufacturing production in 1980 is structurally the same as in 1958, with brewing being the most important industrial branch. On the other hand, the commercial sector has risen from 9.3 percent to 27.7 percent of the national product, which indicates the astounding energy of this remarkable bureaucratic and business class. The mining branch still is also dependent on multinational groups on the technical and commercial level. As for the so-called public sector, its dismantling continues in 1982 to the advantage of private and foreign interests.

Under these conditions, reintroducing the Zairian situation, as the Belgian authors do, in a system of analysis, according to which mining countries are naturally led to such waste and such imbalance, the results of an inevitable dependence, trivializes it when it shows exactly all the characteristics of a model of dependence, with a local ruling class which perpetuates and consolidates, thanks to close collaboration with international capitalism, the operation of a system which it set up itself for its own interests.

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